e-Book Crete, 1941: The Battle at Sea download

This is a excellent book on the involvement and actions of the Royal Navy during the Greece and Crete campaigns. There are a few pages discussing the Army campaign on the island of Crete to give some perspective on the overall story, but not much.

There are two reason why I gave this book 3 stars instead of the 5 stars that other reviewers gave it:

* The book was published in 1972, several years before the public release in the 1970s and 1980s of the information regarding the British decoding efforts at Bletchley Park. Consequently, the book is a bit dated in it's treatment of the British assessment of the strategic situation in early 1941 regarding the actions of the German Army and the Luftwaffe.

* The book repeats the typical 1960s and 1970s versions of the events in Greece and Crete on how the poor British RAF was helplessly outnumbered and doomed to defeat, even though the pilots fought bravely. Modern scholarship has shown pretty conclusively that the reason the RAF was outnumbered was because of poor decisions made by the Government (I.e., Churchill) and the senior commanders of the British RAF and the Army. The issues are complicated, but they range from a serious underestimation of the capabilities of the German Army and the Luftwaffe to just plain incompetence.

As a result of breaking the German codes, the British knew quite a lot of what the German were planning. In many instances, this information wasn't passed on to the British senior commanders in the field. It may not have mattered much anyway if the British Army commanders had been given more information -- the British Army performance on Crete wasn't all that great. It's a classic case that just because you might know what the enemy is going to do, that doesn't mean you can stop him from doing it.

The German invasion of Crete probably should have failed, but inept British government and military decisions resulted in a humiliating British defeat. The book provides a very good overall study of the Royal Navy efforts in the campaign, but the strategic assessments are weak or at least out of date.

This is only one of the numerous CASSELL paperback reprints in my collection, and I really believe that for the money, versus the history given, these are some of the best books available.

This one concerns the battle for Crete, 1941, but as the cover clearly states, this has to do with the battle at sea. The land battle for Crete went to the Germans, and likewise the battle at sea. The RAF provided little to no protection, resulting in 'target practice' for the Luftwaffe. The Royal Navy wasn't too 'royal' losing 3 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 2 battleships and 1 aircraft carrier. While other cruisers and battleships suffered various degrees of damage. Oh yeah, close to 2,000 officers and men of the Royal Navy were killed in action.

All of this ties in with the several months of action for the Royal Navy in conjunction with the Yugoslavian, Grecian, and Crete campaigns. All of which would have been better for the British and the Royal Navy had they stayed home and skipped the debacle.

This book was originally published in 1972, and CASSELL is to be commended for reissuing it. Makes a good companion the other studies on the land battles for Crete. Very informative read.

Semper Fi.

This is an enoyable, well-written and very even-handed treatment of a fascinating, discrete subject. One marvels at the heroism, tradition and bravery of the RN, and the author gives due credit to the aggressive tactics of the Luftwaffe. As for the Italian Navy,well, the author is fair, and says good things about the few things he can. I actually had no idea the Italian navy could have so easily swept the British from the Eastern Mediterranean, if they had the will, and the tradition. It always amazes me when I read books like this, meaning well-written ones, how brave people at war can be. Also a very fair view taken of Cunningham, not just hagiography. Finally, after getting their behinds kicked by the Luftwaffe due to no air cover for its ships, how could the Brits possibly have sent out the Repulse and Prince of Wales (w/o air cover) in December of the same year?